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Skepticism has been expressed concerning the possibility to understand others’ intentions
by simply observing their movements: since a number of different intentions may have
produced a particular action, motor information—it has been argued—might be sufficient
to understand what an agent is doing, but not her remote goal in performing that
action. Here we challenge this conclusion by showing that in the absence of contextual
information, intentions can be inferred from body movement. Based on recent empirical
findings, we shall contend that: (1) intentions translate into differential kinematic patterns;
(2) observers are especially attuned to kinematic information and can use early differences
in visual kinematics to anticipate the intention of an agent in performing a given action;
(3) during interacting activities, predictions about the future course of others’ actions
tune online action planning; (4) motor activation during action observation subtends a
complementary understanding of what the other is doing. These findings demonstrate
that intention understanding is deeply rooted in social interaction: by simply observing
others’ movements, we might know what they have in mind to do and how we should act
in response.
Keywords: kinematics, intention understanding, reach-to-grasp, social intention, complementary actions, mirror
system
The actions we perform in daily life are usually driven by a
prior intention. A current controversy concerns the possibility
to understand the intentions of others by simply observing their
movements (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Csibra, 2007; Kilner
et al., 2007; Jacob, 2008, 2009). A person grasping an apple may
grasp it to eat or to hand it to another person (Figure 1). Is
it possible to anticipate what he/she is going to do next from
the way he/she reaches and grasps the apple? Could an observer
understand the person’s intention by simulating the observed
movement?
Questioning motor theories of social cognition, Jacob and
Jeannerod (2005) argued against this possibility: motor infor-
mation might allow an observer to represent what an agent is
doing, i.e., his/her intention in action, but will not allow him to
understand why the agent is performing that particular action,
i.e., his/her prior intention (Searle, 1983). Since the same motor
sequence can serve different prior intentions, motor simulation—
it has been claimed—might be sufficient to understand the agent’s
intention in action (e.g., grasping the apple), but it is not suffi-
cient to understand the agent’s remote goal in grasping the object.
In other words, motor simulation is not sufficient to understand
whether the agent is grasping the apple: (1) with the individual
intention to eat it; (2) with the social intention to offer the apple to
another person; or (3) with the communicative intention to show
the apple to another person. To substantiate their claims, Jacob
and Jeannerod (2005) proposed the following thought experi-
ment. Consider the case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The former
is a renowned surgeon who performs appendectomies on his
anesthetized patients. The latter is a dangerous sadist who per-
forms exactly the same hand movements on his non-anesthetized
victims. As it turns out, Mr. Hyde is Dr. Jekyll. Suppose that
Dr. Watson witnesses Dr. Jekyll alias Mr. Hyde reaching and
grasping for a scalpel. Would it be possible for Dr. Watson to rec-
ognize the different social intentions of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
in grasping the object?
According to Jacob and Jeannerod (2005), this is unlikely.
Since the same movement sequence can be at the service of
different social intentions, a simply motor equivalence between
observed action and its motor representation in the observer’s
brain,might allowDr.Watson to represent what the action is (e.g.,
that’s a grasping), but will not allow him to discriminate between
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde’s social intentions.
Here we challenge this conclusion by showing how motor
information conveyed by visual kinematics may provide a direct
access to others’ intentions. To illustrate this we focus on one of
the most investigated objected-oriented action, grasping. Based
on recent empirical findings within the grasping literature, we
shall contend that:
1. in contrast to the assumption that the same movement might
serve different intentions, the way an object is reached and
grasped varies depending on the intention with which the
object is grasped;
2. observers are especially attuned to kinematic information and
can use early differences in visual kinematics to anticipate
others’ intentions in grasping an object;
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FIGURE 1 | Intention from movement understanding. The same action
sequence—reaching toward and grasping an apple (A)—can be performed
with different intents: (B) eat the apple, or (C) hand the apple to another
person. Is it possible to understand the intention of a person grasping the
apple by simply observing her movement?
3. during interacting activities, predictions about the future
course of others’ actions are integrated with pre-planned
grasping actions;
4. motor activation during observation of grasping movements
is sensitive to intention, and subtends a complementary repre-
sentation of what the other is doing.
KINEMATIC SPECIFICATION OF INTENTION
The action of grasping an object might be performed with differ-
ent intents: touch, use, move, throw, or pass. Evidence that prior
intention shape action kinematics was first provided by mea-
suring prior-to-contact grasping kinematics for reach-to-grasp
movements performed toward a bottle filled with water (Ansuini
et al., 2008; see also, Marteniuk et al., 1987; Ansuini et al.,
2006; Sartori et al., 2011a). By comparing hand shaping across
tasks involving different subsequent actions—pour the water into
a container, throw the bottle, move the bottle from one spa-
tial location to another spatial location—the authors were able
to demonstrate how the prior intention in grasping the object
strongly affected the positioning of the fingers during the reaching
and the contact phases of the movement.
Using the same experimental window—reach-to-grasp for an
object—variations in the kinematic patterning have been demon-
strated for prehensile movements performed with an individual
intention and prehensile movements preparing to a subsequent
social interaction (Becchio et al., 2010; see also Mason and
MacKenzie, 2005; Meulenbroek et al., 2007). Participants reached
toward an object and grasped it either to move it from one spatial
location to another (individual intention) or to place it into the
hand of a partner (social intention). The results revealed a signif-
icant decrease in maximal finger aperture and peak grip closing
velocity when the object was grasped to be passed to the partner
(Becchio et al., 2008a). Similarly, Ferri et al. (2010, 2011) found
that when a piece of food was grasped to be placed into the mouth
of a human receiver, the final phase of the reaching slowed down
compared to when the same action sequence was directed to a
mouth-like aperture on the “face” of a human body shape.
Actions such as placing an object into a conspecific’s
hand or mouth directly affect the behavior of another agent.
Communicative acts, in contrast, aims at influencing indirectly
the behavior as a consequence of changing the mental state of the
recipient. Successful communication relies on the fact that the
recipient understands and recognizes the intention of the com-
municative act (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). To test whether com-
municative intentions modulate movement kinematics, Sartori
et al. (2009a) devised a task in which participants used two spher-
ical objects—a green and blue sphere—to communicate with a
partner in a binary code. Different color sequences were associ-
ated with specific words. Participants were asked to select a word
(and thus a color sequence) and to communicate it to the partner
by lifting the spheres in the corresponding order. Relative to the
execution of the same action sequence with no-communicative
intent—grasp an object and simply lift it—approach movements
to the object were more careful and accurate when the lifting
action was performed with the scope to show the object to the
interacting partner.
Taken together, these findings contradict the assumption that
the same movement can serve different prior intentions (e.g.,
Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Csibra, 2007; Kilner et al., 2007;
Jacob, 2008, 2009). Intentions influence action planning so that,
although the to-be- grasped object remains the same, different
kinematic features are selected depending on the remote goal to
be achieved.
INTENTION-FROM-MOVEMENT UNDERSTANDING
Is it possible to understand the intentions of other people from
observing their movements? The finding that intentions shape
action kinematics allows us to refine the question: are observers
sensitive to differences in visual kinematics? Are they able to
use these differences to understand other people’s intentions in
grasping an object?
One approach to investigate the contribution of motor infor-
mation to intention understanding is to use temporal and spa-
tial occlusion methods (Abernethy and Russell, 1987). Sartori
et al. (2011a) adopted this approach to investigate how well
observers can discriminate between cooperative, competitive,
and individual intentions on the basis of movement observa-
tion. The experiment consisted of a motion recording phase
and an intention discrimination task. First, to assess whether
intention information was indeed available in the movement
stimuli, they analyzed the kinematics of reach-to-grasp move-
ments performed with the intent to cooperate with a partner,
compete against an opponent, or performing an individual action
at natural or fast speed. Next, to assess attunement to kinematic
information, video clips of the same grasping movements were
presented to participants in an intention discrimination task.
To ensure that only advance sources of information were made
available as to judge the model’s intention, videos were tempo-
rally occluded at the time the fingers contacted the object so
that neither the second part of the movement nor the interact-
ing model, when present, was visible. The results revealed that
observers were able to discriminate between cooperative, compet-
itive and individual trials (Sartori et al., 2011a). Discrimination
performance was similar for full-body video clips and partially
occluded video clips, displaying only the arm and forearm of the
model.
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Video clips have the advantage of capturing the near nor-
mal visual input that is available when watching the motion of
others. However, because movement information is provided in
conjunction with other sources of information, they do not allow
determining the specific role of motion cues. A method employed
to isolate the contribution of kinematics is the point-light tech-
nique (Johansson, 1973). With this method, the movements of a
body are represented by a small number of point-lights indicating
the major joints of a moving person. Despite the drastic degrada-
tion of the stimulus, observers can easily understanding what an
actor is doing in a point-light display (e.g., Dittrich, 1993). From
observing a point-light action, they can identify the identity (e.g.,
Loula et al., 2005), gender (e.g., Kozlowski and Cutting, 1977;
see also, Pollick et al., 2005; Richardson and Johnston, 2005), age
(e.g., Montpare and Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988), and emotion of
the actor (Atkinson et al., 2004). Moreover, observers can easily
discern activities involving two individuals represented through
point-light displays (Mass et al., 1971; Manera et al., 2010), being
able to use the action of one agent to predict the actions of a
second agent (Neri et al., 2006; Manera et al., 2011a,b).
Observers viewing point-light displays of grasping move-
ments can estimate the visual size of the invisible grasped object
(Campanella et al., 2011). Manera et al. (2011c) examined
whether they can also discern the intention in grasping the object.
To this end, they presented participants with point-light displays
of grasping movements performed with the intent to cooper-
ate, to compete, or to perform an individual action (Figure 2).
Point-light clips were temporally occluded at the time the fingers
contacted the object, so that the second part of the movement was
not visible.
FIGURE 2 | Examples of stimuli used in to investigate the contribution
of motor information to intention understanding. (A) Single frames
extracted from a video clip representing an individual cooperative action
sequence. (B) Single frames extracted from a point-light clip representing
the same cooperative action sequence. Adapted from Manera et al. (2011c).
The results demonstrated that participants were able to
pick up the intention information available in the kinematic
patterns: although discrimination was less accurate than under
full-light conditions, observers were nonetheless able to discrim-
inate between cooperative, competitive, and individual grasping
actions (mean accuracy for the video clips = 76% of correct
responses; mean accuracy for the point-light clips = 72% of cor-
rect responses). In this study, graspingmovements were displayed
from a lateral perspective, i.e., the perspective of passive observer.
A question for future research is whether discrimination of inten-
tion is influenced by the viewpoint, i.e., whether discrimination
of intention is facilitated when the action is observed from a view
consistent with the observer performing the action or a potential
interacting partner performing the action.
CLOSING THE LOOP: FROM SOCIAL INTENTION TO SOCIAL
AFFORDANCE
During social interaction, understanding others’ intentions is
only part of the story (Frith and Frith, 2010): predictions about
the future course of other’s actions need to be integrated with
pre-planned actions. For instance, when cooperating with a part-
ner to accomplish a task (e.g., building together a tower with
wooden blocks), we might use online action and intention pre-
diction to plan an appropriate response to be performed at an
appropriate time (Georgiou et al., 2007). But, imagine to be asked
to cooperate with a partner who clearly displays the intention to
compete, or vice versa. Howwould the incongruent attitude of the
partner influence the implementation of your action? Translating
this scenario into an experimental setting, Becchio et al. (2008b)
have shown how interacting with a partner displaying an incon-
gruent attitude produces a reversal in the kinematic patterning.
Participants were asked to reach and grasp a wooden block either
to cooperate with a partner in building a tower or to compete
to place their object first in the middle of the working surface.
For the congruent trials, the partner—a semiprofessional stage
actor—displayed an attitude congruent with the task instructions:
cooperative for the cooperative task, competitive for the compet-
itive task. For the incongruent trials, her attitude was manifestly
in contrast with the task instructions: competitive for the cooper-
ative task, cooperative for the competitive task. Results revealed a
significant reversal of kinematic patterning for incongruent tri-
als: when cooperating with a partner displaying the intention
to compete, the agent’s kinematic pattern became similar to a
competitive pattern; when competing with a partner displaying
the intention to cooperate, the kinematic pattern became simi-
lar to a cooperative pattern. These findings might indicate that
during incongruent trials participants were able to infer the part-
ner’s incongruent intention and this led to a re-planning of the
action sequence. In this interpretation, reversal in the kinematic
patterning would emerge as a consequence of intention attri-
bution. An alternative yet not mutually exclusive explanation is
that changes in the agent’s kinematics resulted from interpersonal
alignment. When people interact, they become aligned at many
different levels, from basic motor programs to high-level aspects
ofmeaning (Frith, 2008). Alignment in action, enabled by in-built
motor resonance mechanisms (see below), may allow individ-
uals to automatically adjust their actions to those of another
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person to achieve a common goal (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008;
Marsh et al., 2009). In this view, coordinated resonance might
contribute to the emergence of cooperative and competitive
patterns.
Beyond eliciting coordination, direct perception of inten-
tion in action has been proposed to afford specific action plans
(Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2011). Raising an empty hand
to ask for an object is a prime example. Using a perturba-
tion paradigm, Sartori et al. (2009b) demonstrated that the
social affordance of this gesture can be so powerful as to over-
ride the initial motor plan. Participants were instructed to grasp
an object and then locate it on a platform. On 20% of trials,
at the moment the participants started the action toward the
objects, a co-experimenter unexpectedly stretched out her arm
and unfolded her hand as if to ask for the object. Analysis of
the participants’ spatial trajectories revealed a significant veering
in the arm trajectory occurring 165ms following the perturba-
tion. Strikingly, in some trials, participants totally disregarded
the instructions and handed the object to the co-experimenter.
No changes in movement trajectory were observed when the
human co-experimenter was replaced by a robotic agent or when
the perturbation consisted of a human arm conveying no social
intention. Ferri et al. (2011) report a similar perturbation effect
for the aperture of the mouth signaling the request to be fed.
Exposure to this signal influences both the reaching and the plac-
ing phase of action sequences unrelated to feeding, e.g., reach
and grasp a sugar lump and touch with it the forehead of the
partner. As for hand request gestures (Sartori et al., 2009b),
changes in movement parameterization are only observed when
the partner’s gaze was available, suggesting that gaze—acting a as
a strong cue to intention (Becchio et al., 2010)—might be criti-
cal to activate an appropriate complementary action plan in the
observer.
Taken together, these findings suggest that during social inter-
action, agents integrate the predictions about the future course of
others’ actions into their own action planning. As a result, action
kinematics does not simply reflect the agent’s intention, but also
the intentions of others.
MIRRORING BEYOND SIMULATION
What neural mechanisms mediate this ability to extract inten-
tion from motion? It has been proposed that an important
function of the motor system lies in the prediction of others’
actions (Blakemore and Frith, 2005; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005;
Prinz, 2006). Observing others’ actions activates corresponding
representations in the observer’s motor system and these repre-
sentations might be used to generate predictions by running an
internal simulation (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). This simula-
tion is thought to be carried out by neurons in the premotor
and the parietal cortex that are active during both action execu-
tion and action observation—the so-called mirror-neuron system
(Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
Evidence that in humans activity in mirror areas is sensitive to
subtle difference in kinematics conveying intention information
is provided by two recent functional MRI studies. Vingerhoets
et al. (2010) found that discriminating between an actor’s inten-
tion to move or use an object based on the visual properties of the
movement involves multifocal activations within the intraparietal
sulcus, a region also involved in planning of grasp-related actions
(Tunik et al., 2007). Becchio et al. (2012) report that in absence
of contextual information, observing prehensile movements per-
formed with a social intent relative to prehensile movements per-
formed with an individual intent activates mirror areas, including
the inferior frontal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule (along
with the brain areas with no mirror properties, i.e., the temporo-
parietal junction and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, which are
normally involved in processing social intentions).
Contrary to the assumption that motor simulation merely
reflects what an agent is doing (i.e., grasping), these findings
might indicate that simulation processes within the observer
motor system integrate why aspects conveyed by action kinemat-
ics. An alternative, non-mutually exclusive explanation is that
differential activity within mirror areas reflects the activation
of a complementary response. Evidence favoring this hypoth-
esis comes from experiments showing that laboratory training
(e.g., Catmur et al., 2007) and context (Newman-Norlund et al.,
2007; van Schie et al., 2008; Sartori et al., 2011b) can reverse mir-
ror activity. For example, Newman-Norlund et al. (2007) report
that merely changing the context in which an action is embed-
ded modulates mirror activity so that activation in the inferior
frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule is greater during prepa-
ration of complementary than of imitative prehensile actions.
Along the same lines, Sartori et al. (2011b) demonstrate that
depending on the context, motor-evoked potentials to transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation reflect the observed movement or the
complementary movement. When an object is present and the
observer is implicitly required to act upon the object in response
to the observed action, a shift from symmetrical motor reso-
nance to complementary activations of hand muscles is observed.
As prehensile movement performed with different intents are
likely to evoke in the observer different complementary response,
these findings might well explain why activation within mirror
areas is modulated by intention. Note than on this account, mir-
ror activation during action observation would not implement
a simulation of the observed action, but subtend “a direct inter-
subjective perception of what the other is doing” (Gallagher,
2008).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Because kinematics retains specificity to the person’s intention
in producing a certain action, intention information is poten-
tially available in the human kinematic pattern (Runeson and
Frykholm, 1983). In this perspective article we have drawn
together studies that highlight the importance of intention-from-
movement information in social interaction. By simply observing
others’ movements, we might know what they have in mind to
do. This knowledge is critical to discriminate between move-
ments performed with different intents, predict what others will
do next, and plan an appropriate complementary act in response.
A challenge for future research will be to clarify how movement
kinematics combines with other sources of information in the
online prediction of others’ actions. There are many situations
in which the intention of an observed actor can be unambigu-
ously inferred from goal objects and/or situational constraints.
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If the scene involves multiple possibilities of action, however,
combining movement kinematics with other information might
be crucial for action prediction. Stapel et al. (in press) found
that in action observation settings observers exploit subtle move-
ment cues rather than the direct visual information about
target objects and context to predict how an ongoing action
will unfold. Inasmuch as social interaction is rooted in the
actions of the interacting agents, we would expect reliance on
movement kinematics to be even greater during online social
interaction.
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